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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This Supplemental Brief is intended to clarify the arguments raised in the first 
issue of the Appellant's Brief: whether the district court lacked jurisdiction to order 
restitution in Ms. Jensen's case. After further reflection, undersigned counsel 
determined that this issue really presents two separate issues and requested that she 
be allowed to file a supplemental brief to clarify and preserve both of these issues. (See 
Motion for Supplemental Briefing.) This request was granted by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. (Order Granting Motion to File Supplemental Appellant's Brief.) 
Therefore, Ms. Jensen now contends that the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to order restitution years after her case had become final. Furthermore, 
even if the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to order restitution, the district 
court erred in ordering restitution because the State failed to demonstrate how 
restitution was necessary. Additionally, the district court's original restitution order, 
which was vacated by the district court and not appealed from by the State, should not 
now be affirmed on appeal. Finally, Ms. Jensen refers this Court to her Appellant's 
Brief, for her arguments in support of her final issue on appeal, whether the district court 
abused it discretion in ordering her to pay $22,500 in restitution in light of her lack of 
financial resources and earning ability 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
The Statement of Facts and Court of Proceedings were previously articulated in 
the Appellant's Brief and are incorporated herein by reference. 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction to enter either restitution 
order years after Ms. Jensen's criminal case had become final? 
2. Did the district court err in ordering restitution because the State failed to 
demonstrate the delay in filing for restitution was reasonable and necessary? 
3. Should the district court's original restitution order, which was vacated by the 
district court and not appealed from by the State, now be affirmed by this Court? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Ms. Jensen to pay 
$22,500 in restitution in light of her inability to pay? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Lacked Subiect Matter Jurisdiction To Enter Either Restitution Order 
Years After Ms. Jensen's Criminal Case Had Become Final 
The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order Ms. Jensen to pay 
restitution in this case; therefore, neither order of restitution should have been entered. 
A district court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that can be raised at 
anytime. State V. Armstrong, 146 ldaho 372, 375, 195 P.3d 731, 734 (Ct. App. 2008); 
State V. Rogers, 140 ldaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131. Subject matter jurisdiction 
generally refers to a court's general power or ability to hear and decide a particular 
class or type of cases. See id. at 227-28, 91 P.3d at 1131-32. The ldaho Supreme 
Court has been reluctant to grant subject matter jurisdiction to criminal courts beyond 
that which is provided for by statute or court rule. In Sfate v Jakoski, 139 ldaho 352, 79 
P.3d 711 2003), the ldaho Supreme Court noted that it has "long recognized that a 
court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside the judgment in a case does not continue 
forever." 139 at 554, 79 P.3d at 713. The Court went on to find that "absent a statute or 
rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a 
judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for 
appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." Id. at 355, 79 P.3d at 714. Similarly, 
in State v.Taylor, 142 ldaho 30, 121 P.3d 961 (2005), the Court found that under ldaho 
Code § 19-2601 (4) the district court's jurisdiction under the retained jurisdiction statute 
in effect at that time expired after 180 days and the district court could no longer place 
the defendant on probation once that time period had passed. Id. at 31, 121 P.3d at 
962. 
In Idaho, it is generally recognized that criminal courts have no power or authority 
to direct reparations or restitution to a crime victim in the absence of a statutory 
provision to such effect. State v. Richmond, 137 ldaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 
(Ct. App. 2002). ldaho Code section 19-5304 provides authority for the district court in 
a criminal case to order the payment of restitution to the victims of the defendant's 
crime. Id. Specifically, ldaho Code section 19-5304(6) provides that "[rlestitution orders 
shall be entered by the court at the time of sentencing or such later date as deemed 
necessary by the court." I.C. § 19-5304(6) (emphasis added.); see also State v. 
Ferguson, 138 ldaho 659,67 P.3d 1271 (2002). 
Here, Ms. Jensen contends that, much like in the case of a defendant's plea, 
once the remitter in her case was issued and the judgment of conviction became final, 
the district court no longer had jurisdiction over her case. See State v. Jakoski, 139 
ldaho 352, 79 P.3d 711 (2003). Therefore, the district court lost jurisdiction over 
Ms. Jensen's case in June 2002. (See R.36018, pp.11, 56.) Furthermore, even if the 
vague language in 19-5304(6) allowing restitution to be entered at a later date "deemed 
necessary by the court" allows for restitution to be entered after the district court's 
jurisdiction to alter the judgment in other aspects has ended, this should be narrowly 
construed and, in this case, over five years later was not necessary. 
Although no definition or clarification is given in the statute regarding when a later 
date is "necessary," in Ferguson, the ldaho Court of Appeals explained, "[tlhis section 
contemplates that that the court may need to grant the prosecution a reasonable 
amount of time necessary to gather information so as to locate all the victims and 
correctly compute the amount of restitution." Ferguson, 138 ldaho at 662, 67 P.3d at 
1274 (emphasis in original). The court found that the authority to enter restitution under 
section 19-5304 was not limitless stating, "[ilt does not, however, vest the court with the 
power to extend the entry of the order of restitution beyond the closing of the case and 
discharge of the defendant." Id. Unfortunately, to what extent "a reasonable amount of 
time necessary" extends was not discussed beyond the context of that case and no 
other appellate cases in ldaho have dealt with this issue. 
However, in the ldaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinaffer, Rule 35) context, the ldaho 
appellate courts have better defined or addressed "a reasonable time." The Courts 
have determined that when a Rule 35 motion is filed by a defendant, the district court 
must rule on it within reasonable time or it loses jurisdiction. See Sfafe v. Day, 131 
ldaho 184, 185, 953 P.2d 624, 625 (Ct.App.1998) (quoting State v. Chapman, 121 
ldaho 351, 354, 825 P.2d 74, 77 (1992)). In State v. Nickerson, 123 ldaho 971, 974, 
855 P.2d 56, 59 (Ct. App. 1993), the ldaho Court of Appeals found that although "no 
action was taken on Nickerson's motion to reduce his sentence for approximately one 
year while the appeal from the judgment proceeded," the district court ruled on the 
motion within a reasonable period of time. Id. Therefore, the district court did not lose 
jurisdiction to act on Nickerson's Rule 35 motion. Id. at 975, 855 P.2d at 60. However, 
the ldaho Court of Appeals has noted that thirty-four months is an unreasonable amount 
of time, when no justification for the delay was given. Sfafe v. Payan, 132 ldaho 614, 
619, 977 P.2d 228, 233 (Ct. App. 1998). In Payan, the Court of Appeals held that the 
district court lost jurisdiction to rule on the Rule 35 motion in light of this delay. The 
ldaho Court of Appeals has held that it is ultimately defense counsel's responsibility to 
request that the district court make a ruling on a Rule 35 motion within a reasonable 
time frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and justification for the delay, to 
avoid the risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction. Day, 131 ldaho at 186, 953 P.2d at 
626. Similarly, when requesting restitution, it is the State's burden to make the 
restitution request and it should be the State's burden to follow up with the district court 
to ensure that the restitution request is being acted on within a reasonable time frame 
and that any delay is justified as necessary. Here, the State admitted at the eventual 
restitution hearing that it could have been more diligent in pursing restitution and that 
the request did not come because the amounts of restitution had just come to light, but 
rather because the State simply just figured out that restitution had never been ordered. 
(Tr., p.52, L.19-p.53, L.8.) 
Ultimately, the delay of six years from the judgment of conviction (or five years 
from the remititur) prior to issuing the original restitution order and the seven year delay 
prior to entering the amended restitution order was not a reasonable time for restitution 
to be determined. Therefore, the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter either 
the restitution order and the Amended Order of Restitution should be vacated because 
the delay in filing was not reasonable. 
The District Court Erred When It Ordered Restitution Because The State Failed To 
Demonstrate The Delay In Filing For Restitution Was Reasonable And Necessary 
Even if the district court still had subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Jensen's 
case to enter the restitution order, it still did not have the authority or general jurisdiction 
under ldaho Code section 19-5304 to order jurisdiction. As noted above in section I, 
ldaho Code section 19-5304 provides the authority for the district court in a criminal 
case to order the payment of restitution to the victims of the defendant's crime and 
under ldaho Code section 19-5304(6), "[rlestitution orders shall be entered by the court 
at the time of sentencing or such later date as deemed necessary by the court." 
I.C. $j 19-5304(6) (emphasis added); see also State v. Ferguson, 138 ldaho 659, 67 
P.3d 1271 (2002). Therefore, the trial court's exercise of discretion in requiring 
restitution must be within the boundaries provided in this statute. Sfafe v. Cheeney, 144 
ldaho 294, 296, 160 P.3d 451, 453 (Ct. App. 2007). Furthermore, the interpretation of 
this statute is a question of law over which the appellate courts exercise free review. 
Id.; State v. Waidelich, 140 ldaho 622, 623, 97 P.3d 489, 490 (Ct. App. 2004). 
Ms. Jensen contends that the district court exceeded the boundaries of this statute 
because the State did not demonstrate that the six to seven years taken by the State to 
pursue a restitution order was a reasonable amount of time necessary for them to 
compute the amount of restitution and for the district court to issue the amended order 
of restitution.' 
ldaho code section 19-5304(6) "contemplates that that the court may need to 
grant the prosecution a reasonable amount of time necessary to gather information so 
as to locate all the victims and correctly compute the amount of restitution." Ferguson, 
138 ldaho at 662, 67 P.3d at 1274 (emphasis in original). It is the State's obligation to 
demonstrate that the delay in an entry of the order of restitution was necessary. Id. 
' Arguably the approximately one year spent between the original restitution order and 
the amended restitution order were spent by the State attempting to at least pursue a 
restitution request; therefore, it is the six years prior to this that Ms. Jensen is mainly 
concerned with and argues was not a reasonable amount of time to pursue jurisdiction 
in this case. 
Here, when ruling on the State's motion for restitution, the district court 
mistakenly concentrated on whether the delay in filing the order of restitution prejudiced 
Ms. Jensen as opposed to whether it was "necessary," which is the standard provided 
for in ldaho Code section 19-5403. In making its findings the district court stated: 
ldaho Code Section 5304(6) says restitution should be requested at 
the time of sentencing or at a later date. This case does present a lot of, I 
guess the best word I can use is anomalies, a change of status of the 
previous sentencing judge. Frankly, I think the situation where this case 
sort of fell through the cracks, I hate to use that word so strongly. . . .but I 
think that is what [the prosecutor's office] is recognizing and I understand I 
think that's what happened. 
The question in my mind is whether that delay has in any way 
prejudiced the position of the defendant in this case. I conclude it has not. 
(Tr., p.65, Ls.3-15.) However, whether Ms. Jensen was prejudiced is not the correct 
standard. As noted above, the correct standard is whether the delay was "necessary." 
See I.C. § 19-5403. Here, the district court's findings do not indicate that the delay was 
necessary to determine the amount of restitution. 
Furthermore, the State failed to demonstrate that the delay was necessary "to 
gather information so as to locate all the victims and correctly compute the amount of 
restitution." See Ferguson, 138 ldaho at 662, 67 P.3d at 1274. At the restitution 
hearing, the State noted that at the previous hearing it had discussed why the delay in 
restitution was so long stating: 
Obviously at the previous hearing we did discuss what happened 
and why the state ultimately got a restitution order so much later than it 
ordinarily would. We discussed how that was tied up with the previous 
attorney in this case on the defense side and with the judge and then 
various things that resulted in obviously our office actually seeking an 
order from [the interim district court judge], which was much later than it 
would have been normally.. . 
(Tr., p.35, Ls.15-23.) However, there was nothing on the record at the previous hearing 
indicating why there was a delay in filing the restitution order. (See Tr., p.4, L.6 - p.32, 
L.19.) Furthermore, the register of actions only indicates that hearings occurred on 
September 22, 2008, and December 15, 2008, after the Order of Restitution was 
originally filed, and that a hearing scheduled for November 10, 2008, was vacated. 
The State did not present any evidence or argument regarding why it was 
necessary to wait six years before asking that restitution be ordered. Instead, the 
prosecutor explained that previously Ms. Jensen had refused to agree to the restitution 
amount and that the sentencing judge advised Ms. Jensen that she needed to provide 
reasons or file paperwork regarding why she was contesting restitution, otherwise the 
order would be granted. (Tr., p.52, Ls.2-18.) That judge then "left to do water court and 
then he left to do something else." (Tr., p.52, Ls.2-1 8.)2 The prosecutor then stated: 
I'm perfectly happy to concede that, you know, we should have 
been more diligent in making sure that that was done. In fact, 1 think that 
the way we discovered that it was not done is when we adjusted the figure 
for the other two defendants, there was no figure to adjust for Miss 
Jensen. And I could be leaving some things out. This is from the best of 
my memory, and as I indicated, you know, calling witnesses on this wasn't 
our intention on this today. That's how I think we got here. 
And then we found out that there was no restitution order for Miss 
Jensen. We approached [the interm district court judge assigned to the 
case]. He signed the order, which is the order that she was ultimately 
made aware of.. . 
(Tr., p.52, L.19 - p.53, L.8.) The State also argued that even if there was a delay in 
seeking restitution "it certainly didn't operate to her detriment." (Tr., p.60, Ls.3-5.) 
It should be noted that by 2004 a new judge had been assigned the case, when the 
motion for release of exhibits was filed. (R.36018, p.11.) This judge was still assigned 
to the case when the Order of Restitution was granted in 2007. (R.36018, p.1 I .) 
None of this information provided by the prosecutor provided a reason why a 
delay of over six years was necessary for restitution to be ordered. The fact 
Ms. Jensen would not agree to the restitution amount and that she wanted a hearing or 
wanted to be able to provide information regarding the restitution amount, simply means 
that Ms. Jensen was asking the district court to follow the provisions of ldaho Code 
section 19-5304(6), which requires the State to prove the amount of restitution by a 
preponderance of the evidence and provides that either side has a right to present 
evidence relevant to the issue. I.C. § 19-5304(6). The State was still obligated to 
pursue its request for restitution regardless of whether the defense wanted to contest it. 
However, the State never even filed a motion for restitution in this case. (See R.36018, 
pp.6-13.) 
Therefore, because the State failed to provide any reason why the delay of over 
six years was necessary in this case, the district court exceeded its authority or general 
jurisdiction to order restitution pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(6) and the amended restitution 
order should be vacated. 
The Original Restitution Order, Which Was Vacated By The District Court And Not 
Appealed From, Should Not Now Be Affirmed By This Court 
A. Introduction 
In the Respondent's Brief, the State argues that the original restitution order, 
which was filed by the State six years after Ms. Jensen's judgment of conviction, and 
which was subsequently vacated by the district court pursuant to ldaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b) because Ms. Jensen was not given any notice of the order being filed, 
should now be affirmed on appeal because the district court lacked jurisdiction to vacate 
it and Ms. Jensen now lacks jurisdiction to challenge it. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-10.) 
Ms. Jensen contends that because the State failed to appeal from the order setting 
aside the original restitution order, it should not be able to contest that decision now. 
Furthermore, the district court's use of 60(b) was proper in this circumstance. Finally, 
even if the district court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the original order under 60(b), it 
also lacked jurisdiction to enter the order in the first place, therefore setting aside the 
order was proper, 
6. The State Failed To A~pea l  From The Order Grantincl ldaho Rule Of Civil 
Procedure 60(b) Relief 
In response to Ms. Jensen's argument that ordering her to pay restitution was 
improper due to the six year delay in filing such a request, the State contends, for the 
first time on appeal, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant Rule 60(b) relief, to 
vacate the original restitution order due to lack of notice, and to issue an amended order 
after providing notice and an opportunity to be heard to Ms. Jensen. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.5-10.) Although the State is partially correct, lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
can be raised at anytime, not every jurisdictional challenge can be raised at anytime. 
In State v. Rogers, 140 ldaho 223, 91 P.3d 1127 (2004) the ldaho Supreme 
Court explained: 
"Jurisdiction over the subject matter" has been variously defined as 
referring to ( I )  the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought; 
(2) the class of cases to which the particular one belongs and the nature 
of the cause of action and of the relief sought; (3) the power of a court to 
hear and determine cases of the general class to which the particular one 
belongs; (4) both the class of cases and the particular subject matter 
involved; and (5) the competency of the court to hear and decide the case. 
However, subject matter jurisdiction does not depend on the particular 
parties in the case or on the manner in which they have stated their 
claims, nor does it depend on the correctness of any decision made by the 
court. Also, the location of a transaction or controversy usually does not 
determine subject matter jurisdiction. 
Id. at 227-28, 91 P.3d at 1131-32 (quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courfs § 70 (1995)). In 
State v. Armstrong, 146 ldaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct. App. 2008), the ldaho Court of 
Appeals further elaborated on the concept of subject matter jurisdiction explaining how 
the general term "jurisdiction" is often mistakenly used to describe both subject matter 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, as well as the district court's authority to act or 
grant relief in general. Id. at 375-77, 195 P.3d at 734-36. 
Here, the State's arguments do not concentrate on the district court's ability to 
apply Civil Rule 60(b) to restitution cases generally, the State concedes that it has that 
ability. Instead, the State challenges the use of 60(b) in this case and the manner in 
which it was applied. To the extent the State's challenges are to the district court's 
authority to act or grant relief and not the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, these 
challenges cannot be raised on appeal for the first time. Furthermore, the State never 
filed an appeal from the district court's order granting Rule 60(b) relief in this case, or a 
cross-appeal from the amended order of restitution under ldaho Appellate Rule 15. 
(R., pp.6-13.); see Wright v. Wright, 130 ldaho 918, 921, 950 P.2d 1257, 1260 (1998) 
(finding whether the district court improperly granted 60(b) relief was an appealable 
issue.). Therefore, the State cannot now raise challenges to anything other than the 
court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
C. The District Court's Use Of ldaho Rule Of Civil Procedure 60(b) Was Pro~er In 
This Circumstance 
Furthermore, even if the State's argument does involve a question of subject 
matter jurisdiction, the district court had the jurisdiction to act. The State asserts that 
the district court's use of Rule 60(b) was in conflict with the restitution statute because 
the I.C. 3 19-5304(10) only provides 42 days for the defendant to request relief from the 
order; therefore, because the 60(b) request was not filed within 42 days of the restitution 
order, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-10.) 
However, such an interpretation creates a conflict between the 42 days articulated in 
statute and the time-lines outlined in Rule 60(b). Ms. Jensen asserts that because such 
a conflict involves a procedural question, rather than a substantive question, the court 
rule should control; therefore, the district court had authority to act under Rule 60(b) 
The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers is well established in this 
state: 
Our system of government is said to embody a separation of powers. 
Actually, it is more accurate to say that the three branches of government- 
legislative, executive and judicial-have areas of exclusive and shared 
authority. ... [T]he judiciary has exclusive authority, within constitutional 
constraints, to determine the internal processes by which it will perform 
fact-finding and law-stating functions of adjudication. These areas of 
exclusive responsibility often are characterized as "procedure." On the 
other hand, the legislature and judiciary share authority to define the rights 
and duties of private persons vis-a-vis each other or of government vis-a- 
vis individuals. On such issues, court rules or decisions may coexist with 
statutes so long as they do not conflict. When there is a conflict, the 
judiciary defers to the legislature unless the issue is governed by the state 
or federal constitution. In that event the judiciary's constitutional 
interpretation will prevail. This area of shared responsibility often is 
characterized as substantive law. 
State v. Garza, 112 ldaho 778, 785-786, 735 P.2d 1089, 1096-$097 (Ct. App. 1987) 
(Judge Burnett specially concurring). Therefore, when a conflict exists between a 
statutory provision and a court rule regarding a matter of procedure the court rules 
prevail. State v. Currington, 108 ldaho 539, 541, 700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985), R.E.W. 
Constr. Co. v. Dist. Ct. of fhe Third Dist., 88 ldaho 426, 400 P.2d 390 (1965); Carfer v. 
State, 108 ldaho 788, 797-98, 702 P.2d 826, 835-36 (1985) (McFadden, dissenting). In 
the criminal context, "'[s]ubstantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and 
punishment for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and regulates primary rights. 
In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of 
the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated."' Currington, 
108 ldaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 527 P.2d 
674, 677 (1974)); see also Grover v. lsom, 137 ldaho 770, 774, 53 P.3d 821, 825 
(2002). Applying these same principles to the issue at hand, the time frame to seek 
relief from a judgment, as well as the time to seek relief from a restitution order, would 
both be procedural because they both relate to the practice and procedures of the 
courts to determine when a defendant can seek relief from a judgment or order of 
restitution. Therefore, the time constraints outlined in Rule 60(b) should prevail over the 
time limitations in 19-5304(10) and the district court had jurisdiction to grant Ms. Jensen 
60(b) relief. 
D. Even If The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Vacate The Order Under ldaho 
Rule Of Civil Procedure 60(b), The District Court Also Lacked Jurisdiction To 
Enter The Original Order Of Restitution In The First Place; Therefore. Vacating 
The Order Was Proper 
Finally, even if the State is correct and the district court did lack jurisdiction under 
60(b) to order restitution, the district court also lacked jurisdiction to enter the original 
restitution order in the first place. As argued above in section I, and incorporated herein 
by reference, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order restitution in 
this case, either through the original order or the amended order. Therefore, even if a 
jurisdictional challenge to the district court's granting of the 60(b) motion can be 
entertained in this appeal, the district court's jurisdiction to issue the original restitution 
order should also be entertained in this appeal and this Court should find that the district 
court was without jurisdiction to enter the original restitution order. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Ms. Jensen To Pay $22.500 
In Restitution In Liaht Of Her lnabilitv To Pay 
For Ms. Jensen's arguments in support of this issue please see the Appellant's 
Brief, Section 11,  
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Jensen respectfully requests that the Amended Order of Restitution in her 
case be vacated. Alternatively, she asks this Court to reduce the restitution order as it 
deems appropriate or remand her case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 24th day of November, 2009, 
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